Middle East countries are worried about recent events in Iran and they have every reason to be. They fear that internal dissent in Iran will be overcome by efforts by the regime to whip up nationalist sentiment to counter imaginary threats in the Gulf.

Middle East concern with the increase in muscle-flexing by Iran is nothing new of course. But recent events, and most particularly the confused messages coming from Tehran’s leadership structure since the June 12 election fiasco, as well as Iran’s avowed intention to continue nuclear development, have ratcheted up what is turning out to be very legitimate consternation.

It is to be expected that Iran will begin to, if it hasn’t already, create tensions and antagonistic situations elsewhere in the Gulf to divert attention away from its internal issues. That is a classic move by regimes under internal pressure and its potential benefit is not lost on Iranian leaders.

The nuclear issue is a very good example of that. External criticism is routinely dismissed as being an attempt by outsiders to belittle and influence Iran’s existence.

It’s an easy sell.

If left unchecked, Iran may well be emboldened enough by the relative weakness and vulnerability of various Gulf states and the West’s hesitant response to its actions to be tempted to take control of both sides of the Gulf using proxy or more direct means in order to try to establish control over what represents the majority of the world’s oil reserves.

It is estimated that thousands of Iranian or pro-Iranian militants in sleeper cell form are present all around the Gulf. They are said to be providing intelligence to Tehran on a variety of sensitive subjects, from military intelligence to behind-the-scenes oil price negotiations.

Iran, according to a general consensus in intelligence services, already enjoys the support of a large majority of the Shi’ite population on the Western side of the Gulf. Bahrain is a Sunnite Monarchy but it reigns over a population consisting largely of Shi’ites. Several terrorist attacks in that country are suspected to have been financed and carried out by pro-Iranian elements.
Saudi Arabia has a very active Shiite population which is concentrated in those areas of the country containing the country’s oil reserves.

Quatar shares a gas contract with Iran which encourages it to maintain good relations with Tehran and Quatar has also shown its willingness to play the go-between for Iran, the Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas in Palestine. This posture is seen as being ambivalent by certain of its neighbours.

The United Emirates is grappling with a territorial dispute with Iran, which claims rights over several small but strategic islands in the Strait of Hormuz. This dispute is dividing the Emirates along lines drawn according to each Emirate’s separate relations with Iran, relations that are largely dominated by petrol or territorial interests.

Iran is also active further afield.

Hamas and the Hezbollah are both dependent on Iranian support in one way or another and Egypt is also struggling to contain the Muslim Brothers, who support the Iranians.

Iraq will constitute a litmus test for Iranian intentions once American troops have with drawn in large numbers. Iranian influence is expected to grow in the aftermath of the American withdrawal and its influence could be a major factor in Iraq’s post-war history.

Obama did not endear himself to Gulf states with his conciliatory talk after his election and both Europe and Britain seem to be incapable of articulating a coherent policy to address the various possibilities and options that shall inevitably be exploited by Iran in the near future.

The Middle East chessboard, like any chessboard, has many options and combinations.

What happens next depends on a number of interlinked and evolving factors and who makes what move next.

That means that the long-term outcome of all these manoeuvres is far from being certain today.

And I didn’t even write one word about the intentions of Israel.